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CASE NOTES
TELEVISION IN THE COURT ROOM:
ESTES V. TEXAS (U.S. 1965)
One of the basic rights guaranteed by our Constitution is that
one accused of a crime shall be afforded a fair trial by an impartial
jury. Publication concerning criminal trials may raise serious threats
to this basic right. Exercising their constitutional right to free speech
and press, newspapers, radio, and television broadcasters publicize
court proceedings and the statements of all the parties. Their efforts,
which often jeopardize an accused's right to an impartial trial, have
been condemned as the "legitimate great-grandchild of ordeal by
fire, water and battle."' This note will examine the impact of Estes
v. Texas2 on the general area of prejudicial publicity and its effect
on a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. Consideration will also
be given to state law in reference to the potential impact of this
decision.
Estes v. Texas
The strength of the opposition to trial by mass media is re-
flected by the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, which would neither permit photography in the courtroom
nor the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings.'
In Estes the petitioner recited his claim in the framework of
Canon 35, not contending that it should be enshrined in the four-
teenth amendment, "but only that the time honored principles of
fair play were not followed in his case and that he was thus con-
victed without due process of law."4
Petitioner had been indicted by a Texas grand jury for swin-
dling. Massive pretrial publicity had given the case national noto-
riety. The two days of pretrial hearings were carried live over radio
and television. Live telecasting was prohibited during most of the
trial, but the state's opening and closing arguments were carried
live with sound as were the return of the jury's verdict and its
receipt by the judge. The court's order allowed video tapes without
1 Boldt, Should Cannon 35 Be Amended? 41 A.BA.J. 55 (1955).
2 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
3 Canons of Judicial Ethics. American Bar Association: Judicial Canon 35.
Improper publicizing of Court Proceedings. "Proceedings in court should be con-
ducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court-
room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting
or televising of court proceedings detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings,
distract participants and witnesses in giving testimony, and create misconceptions
with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted."
4 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
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sound of the whole proceeding and the cameras operated inter-
mittently during the three day trial. These films were shown nightly
on regularly scheduled news programs.
In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court expressed concern
with the unconscious impact of television on the jury, the witnesses,
the judge and the accused, particularly when the case was established
as a cause celebre impressing upon the community the "notorious
character of the petitioner as well as the proceedings." 5
The Court held that the televising and broadcasting of portions
of petitioner's criminal trial was prejudicial per se because the in-herent nature of such action infringed the fundamental right to a
fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court held that the procedure employed by the
state involved such a probability that prejudice would result, thatit was lacking in due process, whether or not isolatable prejudice
was demonstrated.
Estes is one of a series of cases concerned with the impact ofpublicity on a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. How-
ever, the case was one of first impression on the issue of tele-
vision in the courtroom and for that reason is based on decisions
from analogous areas.
THE EARLY VrEw
The early cases concerned with the prejudicial effect of masspublicity adopted the criterion that, in the absence of strong evidence
to the contrary, bias alleged to have resulted from publicity was notgrounds for reversal provided that jurors with preconceived opinions
concerning the guilt or innocence of an accused could state to the
court's satisfaction that they would lay aside their opinion, and
render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence
presented at the trial.0
As a result, the presence of extensive and prejudicial publicity
in and of itself was insufficient to establish that an accused hadbeen denied a fair trial.7 Nor could a conviction be reversed merelybecause some of the jurors had read such publications prior to a
trial.' If the prejudicial material was read by jurors while the trial
was progressing, the instructions of the trial judge to disregard any
5 Id. at 545.
6 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878).7 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).8 Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 702 (1926).
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opinion formed by the article was considered sufficient to insure the
right of an accused to an impartial trial.'
These rules were solidified by the United States Supreme Court
in the 1951 case of Stroble v. California.° In rejecting Stroble's
claim that he had been denied a fair trial because of prejudicial
publicity stemming from press coverage and releases to the press by
the district attorney, the Court observed:
Indeed, at no stage of the proceedings has petitioner offered so much
as an affidavit to prove that any juror was in fact prejudiced by the
newspaper stories .... There is no affirmative showing that any com-
munity prejudice ever existed or in any way affected the deliberations
of the jury."
The majority of cases had thus adopted the position that the
decision of the trial judge was almost conclusive on the issue of im-
partiality, when jurors asserted on voir dire that they could render
an impartial verdict.
CREATION OF A NEW STANDARD
Irvin v. Dowd 2 was the first case to place a qualification on the
old standard. Irvin was tried and convicted of murder and was
sentenced to death. The facts indicate that there had been six mur-
ders committed in the vicinity, all of which were extensively covered
by the local news media. The news coverage aroused a great deal of
excitement and indignation among inhabitants of the general area.
Shortly after Irvin was arrested, the prosecutor and the local police
issued press releases stating that Irvin had confessed to the six
murders. These releases were intensively publicized in newspapers
reaching approximately 95 % of the dwellings in the venue. In addi-
tion, both television and radio coverage blanketed the area.
The Supreme Court reversed the state court conviction on the
basis that the jury had been prejudiced prior to trial by inflamma-
tory publicity."i The Court held that a state conviction violates due
process where the record reflects "a pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice" engendered against the accused in the trial venue by
unfavorable pretrial publicity. The Court noted, however, that the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial does not require that jurors
be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. It is sufficient
9 United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1951).
10 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
11 Id. at 195; accord, United States v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956).
12 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
13 Id. at 725.
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if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in the court. 4
The qualification set out in Irvin is that the federal judiciary
must be satisfied that the jurors were capable of, and did lay aside
their preconceived judgment. This is an area of examining the facts
in light of constitutional principles. In this area, the federal judiciary
is not bound by determinations made by the trial court judge.
Having thus qualified the old standard, only two years later the
Supreme Court was called upon to decide the case of Rideau v.
Louisiana.15 In Rideau, defendant was arrested shortly after a bank
robbery-murder. The morning after the arrest a motion picture film
with a sound track was made of an interview in the jail between
the defendant and the local sheriff. The interview consisted of inter-
rogation by the sheriff and confession by the defendant to the crimes
charged. The interview was televised over a local station for three
days. Subsequently, defendant was indicted on charges of armed
robbery, kidnapping, and murder. A request for change of venue
made by defendant's lawyers was denied. Defendant was convicted
of these charges and was sentenced to death. Three members of thejury which convicted him had stated on voir dire that they had seen
and heard the televised confession of defendant. Challenges for cause
of these jurors was denied by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction without any exten-
sive review of the voir dire. The court concluded that the publicity
was so prejudicial that it amounted to the trial itself and subsequent
court proceedings were but a "hollow formality.""
The Rideau decision neither qualifies nor changes the standard
set out in the Irvin case. Instead it creates a new rule in the area of
prejudicial publicity by indicating that the nature of the publicity
itself may make it prejudicial per se regardless of whether or not
the particular jurors deciding the case were impartial.
In light of the foregoing cases, Estes must be considered as
an expansion of the prejudice per se rule. In Irvin and Rideau the
publicity occurred outside the courtroom and could not be effec-
tively curtailed.' The Court in these cases found a venue literally
'4 Id. at 723.
15 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
16 Id. at 733, "But we do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine
a particularized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury
that due process of law in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a
community of people who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised interview."
17 See Bridges v. California and Times v. Superior Court of California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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saturated by venomous pre-trial publicity. However, the Estes deci-
sion did not concern itself to any great extent either with the public
attitude toward the case, or with the content of the publicity in-
volved. The Estes Court found numerous situations in which tele-
vising court proceedings might cause unfairness' 8 and held that
allowing this procedure, involving such a probability that prejudice
would result, made the procedure inherently lacking in due process.' 9
ESTES AND STATE LAW
Prior to the decision in Estes, the states were divided on the
issue of televised criminal proceedings.2" Only two states affirma-
tively permitted television, but many states had not taken an express
stand on the issue, or their positions were very unclear.
People v. Stroble2" is an example of this latter group. In this
case the newspapers had printed the confession of defendant and
statements of the district attorney saying that the accused was
guilty. Further, portions of the trial were carried over television,
and news photography was allowed in the courtroom. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected defendant's claim that he had been
denied a fair trial by pointing out that he had failed to prove that
any juror was in fact prejudiced.22 The decision obviously turns on
defendant's failure to show actual prejudice, but the court appears
to take the position that had the appeal been based solely on the
prejudicial effect of television in the courtroom, the same line of
reasoning would have been followed, requiring a showing of preju-
dice in fact before a reversal would have been granted.2"
The decision in Estes seems to resolve the various inconsisten-
18 381 U.S. 532, 544-50 (1965). Summarized these are: (1) Improperly in-
fluencing jurors by emphasizing the notoriety of the trial and affecting their im-
partial judgment, distracting their attention, facilitating their view of selected
parts of the proceedings, and improperly influencing potential jurors and thus
jeopardizing the fairness of new trials; (2) Impairing the testimony of. witnesses
by causing some to be frightened and others to over-state their testimony; (3) Dis-
tracting judges generally and exercising an adverse psychological effect, particularly
upon those who are elected; and (4) imposing pressures upon the defendant and
intruding into the confidential attorney-client relationship.
19 Id. at 544.
20 The positions of the various states are set out in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 580-82 nn.38 & 39.
21 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951).
22 Id. at 722-23, 226 P.2d at 334, ". . . there is no indication that the jury
• . . based their verdict on the newspaper accounts of the statements rather than
upon the evidence. We can also assume that it was improper to allow the taking
of news photographs or televising in the courtroom; but there is no indication that
the jury's verdict was influenced by the taking of pictures or the televising of
courtroom scenes." [Emphasis added.]
23 Ibid.
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cies in state law. The Court points out that the publicity in Irvin
and Rideau occurred outside the courtroom and could not be effec-
tively curtailed. Nevertheless, the circumstances were held to beinherently suspect and therefore a showing of prejudice was not a
requisite to reversal. The Court continues: "Likewise in this case
the application of this principle is especially appropriate."2 Anyprocedure which would permit the use of television "would be in-
consistent with our concepts of due process."25
Faced with the language, intent and holding in Estes it appears
certain that a state no longer has any discretion on the issue of tele-
vision in the courtroom. In order to satisfy the requirements of dueprocess of law a state must prohibit the "inherent prejudice" of
television.
CONCLUSION
In recent years there has been an increasing sensitivity, at least
in the Supreme Court, for the need to guarantee a criminal defen-
dant's right to due process of law. In the area of prejudicial publicity
this concern centers around a realization of the subconscious effect
on jurors of extra-judicial influences, with the resultant inability
of the defendant to prove with any particularity wherein he was
prejudiced.
The Estes decision followed this trend in finding courtroom
television to have an insidious influence which inherently prevents a
sober search for the truth.
David L. Mousel
24 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965).
25 Ibid.
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